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The April 1992 flood under the Loop

How a bridge piling breached a forgotten freight tunnel and sent about 250 million gallons of river water into the Loop's basements on April 13, 1992.

Monday morning, April 13, 1992. Somebody in a downtown office building went down to the basement and found water. By midday the Loop was being emptied of people, the Board of Trade and the Mercantile Exchange had stopped trading, electricity and gas were off across much of the district, and the Chicago River was draining into a network of tunnels most of the city did not know it had. About a quarter of a billion gallons poured into the Loop's lower levels before anybody could plug the hole. Insurers called it a leak, not a flood, and plenty of Chicagoans still call it "the Great Chicago Leak."

The tunnels nobody remembered

The story starts in 1899, when the city granted rights to dig a narrow tunnel system under the Loop's streets. The company that built it, which became the Chicago Tunnel Company, wanted to move freight, coal, ash and mail below the traffic. The tunnels ran about 40 feet under street level (the city required at least 22.5 feet below the pavement), used a two-foot narrow gauge and grew to about 60 miles by 1914. Nineteen elevators connected the system to customers, 36 industries had direct connections and 22 buildings received coal. The tunnels were celebrated on February 10, 1904, and began revenue service on August 15, 1906. Many were dug quietly, some under private property, which later muddied the question of who owned and maintained them.

The system carried merchandise and mail, and its coal and ash business kept the Loop's furnaces fed. Then trucks took over freight, the company reorganized in 1956 and the Interstate Commerce Commission approved abandonment in July 1959. The company's assets went to auction for $64,000 that October. After that, the tunnels sat unused, under the care of no one in particular. That was part of the trouble in 1992: once the operator collapsed, nobody clearly had the duty to maintain them. Some tunnels still carry power and communications cables.

The piling

It began with a bridge. In late 1991 contractors were replacing pilings, the heavy posts that protect a bridge from river traffic, at the Kinzie Street Bridge over the Chicago River. The new piling was driven about 3.5 feet south of the old ones, next to the north wall of one of the old tunnels, which ran under the river. Driving the piling displaced clay around it, and the clay breached the tunnel wall. Over the following weeks the clay liquefied, which widened the opening. The tunnels had once been fitted with flood doors at their river crossings, but those doors had been removed.

The leak was found before the flood. A telecommunications worker inspecting cable in the tunnels saw water coming in and sent the city a videotape. The city judged the leak not serious and started a repair bid process, which takes weeks. On April 13, the wall gave way.

The day

Water ran from the river into the tunnel and then through the whole system, which connected to the basements and sub-basements of many Loop buildings. The result:

  • About 250 million gallons of water entered the system.
  • Basements and the Pedway flooded, along with the lower levels of Loop buildings. In places the water rose as much as 40 feet in the lowest levels.
  • The Loop was evacuated. Electricity and gas were cut across most of the affected area as a precaution.
  • Trading stopped. The Board of Trade and the Mercantile Exchange closed their trading floors mid-morning.
  • Transportation was disrupted. Downtown parking was banned and some subway routes were closed or rerouted.
  • Landmarks were hit. Buildings in the affected area included the Merchandise Mart, City Hall and the Federal Reserve Bank, according to accounts of the flooded tunnel network.

It took about three days to clean up enough for business to resume, and some buildings stayed closed for weeks. Because the flood came right before Tax Day, the Internal Revenue Service granted disaster extensions. The total cost is stated in different ways, around $2 billion in 1992 dollars by most accounts.

The scale, worked out

A quarter of a billion gallons is hard to picture, so do the math. An Olympic-size swimming pool holds roughly 660,000 gallons. Divide 250 million by 660,000 and you get about 380 pools, all poured into basements and tunnels in a matter of hours. Compare that with the 3.96 billion gallons that one inch of rain would deliver across all of Chicago, a figure worked out in flash flooding and the region's stormwater system: the flood was about 6 percent of that. What made it a disaster was not the volume but where it went. A storm's water spreads over 227 square miles of streets and roofs. This water went into a few dozen blocks of the densest business district in the Midwest, into spaces built to hold electrical vaults, mechanical rooms, archives and storage.

The depth matters just as much. Water rose as high as 40 feet in the lowest levels, which are the levels where buildings keep their power, their telecommunications and their heating plants. A building can lose its upper floors to nothing and stay open. A building that loses its basement loses elevators, lights and phones. That is why so many structures closed even though their offices were dry.

What was at stake in the Loop

The Loop is Chicago's central business district, with the second-largest concentration of offices in North America after Manhattan, and in 1992 it was also home to the Chicago Board of Trade, whose building opened in 1930, and the Mercantile Exchange, the two markets whose trading floors closed on the morning of April 13. The two markets are now part of CME Group and trade largely electronically; in 1992 their floors needed people, power and open doors. The same district holds City Hall, the county building and state and federal offices, which is why the flood shut down government as well as business. The Loop describes the area as it is now, and City Hall at 121 North LaSalle describes the building at its center.

The flood also showed how much of downtown Chicago runs below the street. Lower levels, loading docks, vaults and the Pedway system of underground walkways meant that water could reach places nobody had thought of as connected to the river. In that sense the flood was a map: it showed where the hidden city began.

Stopping the water

Plugging the opening was an engineering emergency with some unusual ingredients. Crews dumped 65 truckloads of rock, cement and old mattresses into a hole about 20 feet wide in the river bottom, trying to slow the flow. The river level was lowered by opening locks downstream, and the freight tunnels were pumped out, with the water drained into the Deep Tunnel system, the region's stormwater tunnels; see flash flooding and the region's stormwater system. The leak was finally sealed with fast-setting concrete, supplied by Material Service Corporation and placed by Kenny Construction, which formed emergency plugs near Kinzie Street.

Afterward the city took over maintenance of the tunnels and installed watertight hatches at the river crossings. The tunnels were then pumped dry and, in the years since, access has been locked down. They still carry cables for power and communications.

Who paid?

The question of responsibility went to the courts. The contractor that had driven the pilings, Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company, was initially found liable. That finding was later undone when courts held that the city had known about the leak and had not properly maintained the tunnel. A separate case, Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., reached the United States Supreme Court in 1995. The Court held that admiralty law applied, which greatly limited the contractor's liability. The ruling meant that a loss of nearly $2 billion was treated under a body of law designed for maritime accidents, which limited what could be recovered from the contractor.

The word "leak" has its own story. Insurance policies typically covered a leak and excluded floods, so the damage was often described that way. The Chicago nickname stuck, and it is a small reminder of how language shapes who gets paid after a disaster.

Why it still matters

The 1992 flood leaves several lessons that apply to the city today.

  1. Hidden infrastructure is still infrastructure. The tunnel network was out of sight and, to most officials, out of mind. A system without an owner is a system without a maintenance budget.
  2. A warning is not an action. The leak was reported, documented on video, and judged not urgent. The time between the first report and the failure was measured in months, and the repair process was too slow for the hazard.
  3. Downtown is more connected than it looks. The Loop's basements, the Pedway and the old tunnels formed a continuous space, so water entering at one point could reach many buildings.
  4. Emergency plans cover floods, not only storms. Not every flood comes from rain; it can come from the river, a main or a failed wall. Emergency preparedness in Chicago covers the basics of readiness, and the city's alert system is in Signing up for the alerts that matter: NotifyChicago and weather warnings.

Seeing it today

Stand in the Loop now and nothing says flood. The Kinzie Street Bridge still spans the river, the Merchandise Mart stands at the river's edge, and the Pedway is dry. The tunnels are not open to visitors, and the only way to see them is through photographs and the histories written about them. For the neighborhood above them, see The Loop, and for a timeline of the city's engineering history from the reversed river to the Deep Tunnel, see Reversing the river: the Sanitary and Ship Canal and The Loop flood of April 13, 1992. The city's transportation department, which maintains the bridges over the river, is described in Chicago Department of Transportation, and the department that runs the water and sewer system in Chicago Department of Water Management.

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